The Government Contractor Defense and Superior Orders in International Human Rights Law by Fraley, Jill M
Florida A & M University Law Review
Volume 4
Number 1 Fall 2008/Spring 2009 Article 3
Fall 2009
The Government Contractor Defense and Superior
Orders in International Human Rights Law
Jill M. Fraley
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida A & M
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. For more information, please contact
linda.barrette@famu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jill M. Fraley, The Government Contractor Defense and Superior Orders in International Human Rights Law, 4 Fla. A&M U. L. Rev. (2009).
Available at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview/vol4/iss1/3
THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
AND SUPERIOR ORDERS IN
INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS LAW
Jill M. Fraley*
ABSTRACT
As military functions are increasingly outsourced to corporate
contractors, civil courts face adjudicating issues of tort liability arising
from actions occurring in war zones. Currently, victims of torture and
other invasive military techniques used at Abu Ghraib and Guanta-
namo Bay seek to prevail over issues of sovereign immunity and to
hold corporations responsible for the actions of their employees. In re-
sponse, corporations shield themselves with the government contractor
defense: an affirmative defense developed in the context of product lia-
bility actions. Recent articles have overwhelmingly suggested that the
defense will prevail and often have argued that it should prevail due to
issues of sovereign immunity.
This article makes a novel claim that places the government
contractor defense in the context of international law. This article ex-
amines the theoretical foundations of the government contractor
defense, comparing the elements of the defense to the international
law of human rights, and argues that the government contractor de-
fense is reducible to a claim of "superior orders." The government
contractor defense is attempting to hang on the coattails of sovereign
immunity, i.e., the defense is nothing more than saying, "the govern-
ment told me to do it." Indeed, this is what corporations argue to
establish the traditional prima facie case for the government contrac-
tor defense: specific orders and compliance with those orders. In light
of the analytical similarity between the two defenses, and given the
absolute ban of the superior orders defense in international law, the
government contractor defense is unacceptable in the context of claims
of human rights violations.
* Jill Fraley graduated from Duke University School of Law, J.D.; Yale Law School,
LLM; University of Kentucky Graduate School, Ph.D. Sociology (anticipated graduation
May 2010).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, the United States has become an interna-
tional forum for civil tort litigation stemming from violations of basic
human rights laws, including prohibitions of genocide, war crimes, and
torture.1 In those cases, plaintiffs have sought monetary damages
from individuals, sovereigns, and corporations. 2 Recent examples in-
clude two consolidated New York cases that ultimately resulted in a
Second Circuit ruling allowing claims to proceed against Radovan
1. See, e.g., Saleh v. Titan Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (alleging
torture); see also Kadic v. Karadz, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (alleging genocide and war
crimes).
2. See, e.g., Saleh, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1087 (against military contractor), Ibrahim v.
Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.C. 2005) (against military contractor); Rasul v. Rumsfeld,
414 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.C. 2006), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008)(mem.)(suit against member of
U.S. executive and military officials); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232 (against a foreign leader); Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003
(1985) (against a foreign nation); Estates of Ungar ex. rel Strachman v. Palestinian Auth.,
315 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D.R.I. 2004) (against Palestinian Authority and PLO).
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Karadzic for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia 3 as well
as the famous torture case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.4 As these exam-
ples suggest, the United States has developed a hospitable forum for
civil rights litigation even where the plaintiffs and defendants are non-
citizens and the acts took place in foreign countries.
The most recent wave of civil litigation originates in alleged
human rights violations committed by the U.S. military and its associ-
ated contractors in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay.5 In
recent years, military contractor involvement has been so commonly
cited in torture allegations that Congressman David Price of North
Carolina introduced legislation that would forbid contractor involve-
ment in interrogations of military prisoners. 6 The cases against
military contractors mark a significant point in the history of civil
human rights litigation in U.S. courts. The movement of military con-
tractors into the field of providing security services in foreign nations
opens up a new category of potential defendants in human rights liti-
gation. The availability of new contractor defendants may well shape
the future of human rights litigation plaintiffs because contractors
may be more susceptible to suits than other defendants have been in
the past. The U.S. military is relying on contractors in greater num-
bers and for a greater range of products and services.7 While there is
some argument about precisely what it means for military services to
be "privatized," and precisely where that line should be drawn, com-
mentators tend to conclude that privatization has increased in recent
3. See Kadic, (consolidating Doe et al. v. Karadz i, 93 Civ. 0878 (PKL) and Kadic v.
Karadz i, 93 Civ. 1163 (PKL)).
4. 630 F.2d 876 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Saleh, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1087; Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 10; CACI Int'l
v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 567 F. Supp. 2d 824 (E.D. Va. 2008) (seeking
declaration of insurance coverage for alleged incidents of torture at Abu Ghraib); Iraqis Sue
Over Abu Ghraib Treatment, APS DIPLOMAT RECORDER, July 5, 2008, available at 2008 WL
13699940 (Citing pending litigation against CACI International and L-3 Communications);
See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (seeking damages against a Canadian oil company for allegedly aiding and abetting
genocide and other human rights violations in the Sudan).
6. Interrogation and Detention Reform Act of 2008, H.R. 7056, 110th Cong. (2008).
7. See Steve Fainaru, Big Boy Rules (2008) (describing U.S. reliance on government
contractors to provide security services in war zones and the lack of supervision over those
contractors by the federal government); Cong. Comm., GAO-08-966, Rebuilding IRAQ: DOD
and State Department Have Improved Oversight and Coordination of Private Security
Contractors in IRAQ, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements (2008)
(statement of William M. Solis, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management) (citing
"extensive reliance" of the U.S. government on military security contractors).
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decades.8  Contractors are "tak[ing] over traditional military
functions."9
Increased privatization, and the array of military functions car-
ried out by private contractors, has resulted in changing civil litigation
trends. While military contractors previously faced suits based on
products claims, the provision of services during military actions pro-
vides new and expanded grounds for claims, including violations of
human rights during security, detention, and interrogation opera-
tions.10 Multiple cases have raised claims that contractors committed
and conspired to commit torture.1 Reports from multiple sources state
that contractors allowed, instructed, or participated in incidents of
abuse and violence that may rise to the level of torture.' 2 Human
Rights First has compiled multiple reports describing alleged human
rights violations by military contractors in Iraq. These include need-
less, reckless injuries and deaths of civilians resulting from
"accidents." These accidents occurred when contractors suddenly di-
verted civilian cars that offered no threat.13 The report also described
excessive use of force and indiscriminate harm to unarmed civilians.'
4
Contractors were also described as giving instructions to lower level
military personnel to carry out the physical abuses or torture described
at Abu Ghraib.' 5 In addition, photos captured the involvement of con-
tractors in the use of unapproved stress positions at Abu Ghraib.
16
One male contractor was also cited in an alleged rape of a juvenile
male prisoner at the facility.17 Overall, the Fay Report, one of several
to investigate the abuses at Abu Ghraib, cited forty-four improper inci-
dents, ten of which involved private contractors.
18
8. See Antenor Hallo De Wolf, Modern Condottieri in Iraq: Privatizing the War from
the Perspective of International and Human Rights Law, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 315
(2006) (For a discussion of privatization in more depth; see also Paul Verkuil, Public Law
Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C.L. REV. 397, 443 (2006)).
9. Henry A. Giroux, Education After Abu Ghraib: Revisiting Adorno's Politics of
Education, 18 CULTURAL STUDIES 779, 803 (2004).
10. See Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 1342823 (S.D. Tex. 2006)
(complaint alleged liability based on providing security services in Iraq).
11. See, e.g., Saleh, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1087; Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
12. See, e.g., The Taguba Report, March 2004, in The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu
Ghraib 405, 417-19 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
13. Human Rights First, Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of
Impunity 12-13 (2008), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/08115-usls-psc-
final.pdf.
14. Id. at 2, 6.
15. Private Security Contractors at War, supra note 14, at 52.
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The Justice Department admitted to at least one open criminal
investigation against a military contractor in Iraq as a result of such
incidents. 19 Similarly, in the Taguba Report, which examined poten-
tial abuses of detainees by the U.S. government, concluded that
contractors were involved and specifically listed a member of the Titan
Corporation as a suspect.20 The report concluded that other contrac-
tors were witnesses and potentially aided, abetted, or conspired with
U.S. military personnel to commit torture and other abuses. 21
Because a number of these alleged acts of torture at Abu Ghraib
were reportedly committed directly by the contractors rather than the
U.S. military, potential civil suits by foreign plaintiffs who suffered
abuses will not face the substantial hurdle of governmental immunity,
and therefore may be more effective than suits brought against the
U.S. government or executive officials. The success of such suits will
be determined by the role of the military contractor defense. If the
courts allow the military contractor defense, it may serve to virtually
eliminate liability for military contractors. On the other hand, if the
defense is barred as inapplicable to security service contracts, then
civil suits against the contractors are likely to lead to damage awards.
In the last few years, several articles have reflected on the gov-
ernment contractor defense in the context of Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo Bay.22 Overwhelmingly, those articles emphasized the
19. Id.
20. The Taguba Report, supra note 12, at 405, 417-19.
21. Id. (citing the involvement of contractors from Titan and CACI International in
torture incidents at Abu Ghraib).
22. See Ryan Micallef, Liability Laundering and Denial of Justice Conflicts Between
the Alien Tort Statute and the Government Contractor Defense, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1375
(2006) (arguing that the government contractor defense should be banned in ATS cases
except in specific cases); Robin M. Donnelly, Civilian Control of the Military: Accountability
for Military Contractors Supporting the U.S. Armed Forces Overseas, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 237 (2006) (describing the defense as a "significant hurdle" for plaintiffs in suits
against military contractors for acts arising out of the provision of security services);
Kateryna L. Rakowsky, Military Contractors and Civil Liability: Use of the Government
Contractor Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2 STAN.
J. Civ. RTs. & Civ LIBERTIEs 365 (2006) (arguing for strict application of the military
contractor defense's limitations as provided by the Supreme Court in Boyle v. United
Technologies and citing the trend of the "expanding" defense in recent military conractor
litigation stemming from Abu Ghraib); Roger Doyle, Contract Torture: Will Boyle Allow
Private Military Contractors to Profit from the Abuse of Prisoners?, 19 PAC. McGEORGE
GLOBAL BuS. & DEV. L. J. 467 (2007) (describing the government contractor's defense as "a
significant substantive barrier" between plantiffs and the possibility of recovering damages
against military contractors for torture); Valerie C. Charles, Hired Guns and Higher Law: A
Tortured Expansion of the Military Contractor Defense, 14 CARDOZO J. INTL & COMP. L. 593
(2006) (arguing that the defense should not apply to claims brought under the ATS because
applying the defense would leave plaintiffs without a remedy or forum); Jeremy Joseph,
Striking the Balance: Domestic Civil Tort Liability for Private Security Contractors, 5 GEO.
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strength of the government contractor defense, and thus were pessi-
mistic about the possibility of plaintiffs waging successful suits against
government contractors. Indeed, some commentators have argued spe-
cifically for the clarification of the government contractor defense as
indeed available within the context of services provided by military
contractors. 23 The argument in favor of providing the defense to con-
tractors is based on the U.S. government's extensive reliance on
military contractors. 24 It is postulated that without the contractors'
involvement in security services, the military would be unable to reach
its intended national security goals. In contrast, this article argues
that the government contractor defense should not be permitted where
the contractor faces tort claims stemming from violations of interna-
tional law of human rights. While the U.S. may significantly rely on
contractors for assistance in military operations, this reliance is not a
significant consideration that would outweigh the necessity of holding
contractors liable for violations of international human rights law just
as soldiers who committed the same acts would be under military law.
The government contractor defense is based upon the same no-
tion as the superior orders defense under international law. The
superior orders defense is the claim that a party should not be liable
because a higher governmental authority instructed that party to carry
out an action in violation of international law. 25 The superior orders
defense has been discredited in the context of international law as a
result of Nazi officers attempting to claim the defense in post-World
War II war crimes tribunals.26 While the defense continues to be
raised by those seeking to avoid liability, particularly those serving at
lower levels in the militaries, the defense is less likely to be successful
as a defense to a claim and more likely to be considered a mitigating
factor. 27 While some questions remain about the fairness of not al-
lowing the superior orders defense in all situations, the defense is less
likely to be available for those crimes that are egregious violations of
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 691 (2007) (recommending that the government contractor defense be
available to private military contractors in the security service/torture cases).
23. See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 23, at 723.
24. David M. Walker, Defense Management DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive
Reliances on Contractors to Improve Management and Oversight (Washington:
Accountability Office, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08572t.pdf. (last visited Mar. 16,
2009).
25. International Criminal Law 123-128 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
26. Gary Solis, Obedience of Orders and the Law of War: Judicial Application in
American Forums, 15 AM. U. INT'L. L. REv. 481, 483 (2000).
27. Id. at 483-485.
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international law. 28 This article argues that because the superior or-
ders defense rejected under International Law, particularly for those
less debatable violations such as genocide and torture, the military
contractor defense should not be available to contractors sued for acts
of torture, given that the fairness issues of the superior orders defense
would be more serious in a criminal as opposed to a civil forum.
The link between the government contractor defense and the
superior orders defense is described in more detail below. Part II pro-
vides an overview of U.S. civil litigation on human rights violations,
particularly summarizing the three most relevant statutory claims sys-
tems. Part III provides a brief history and theoretical summary of the
superior orders defense in international law. Part IV summarizes the
government contractor defense in the context of products liability liti-
gation. Part V analyzes the policy foundations of the government
contractor defense. Finally, Part VI provides a discussion of the
banned superior orders defense and its relationship to promoting
human autonomy and preventing future human rights violations. The
article concludes ultimately that the government contractor defense is
not analytically distinct from the superior orders defense in any mean-
ingful way. Therefore, under treaty obligations in International Law,
American courts should not make the defense available when the alle-
gations stem from violations of international human rights law.
II. CIVIL HuMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Before examining the government contractor defense and its re-
lationship to the superior orders defense, it is important to establish
the statutory framework that surrounds litigation of human rights
claims in the United States. Three statutory schemes are particularly
relevant: the Alien Tort Statute, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the
Torture Victims Protection Act. Each of these statutes plays a sub-
stantial role in providing for and limiting litigation based on human
rights violations.
A. Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provides access to the federal
courts for claims based on torts committed outside the United States.29
28. Id. at 483-484 (egregious violations are torture or genocide rather than use of
excessive force).
29. 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2005) (statute provides that "[tihe district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
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The ATS vests the federal courts with "original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."30 Thus, the ATS "confers
subject matter jurisdiction when the following conditions are met: (1)
an alien sues, (2) for a tort, (3) that was committed in violation of the
'law of nations' or a treaty of the United States."3 1 The third prong of
this test limits the second prong, requiring that the tort either violate
"customary international law" or a treaty of the United States that pro-
vides a private right of action. 32 When the three elements of the ATS
are met, the statute confers jurisdiction, but it does not create a private
right of action for foreign torts. 33 Therefore, the ATS "does not confer
rights nor does it impose obligations or duties," but rather the ATS is
exclusively jurisdictional in nature.34
The ATS relies upon customary international law to provide a
cognizable private cause of action for violations of the most fundamen-
tal and universal human rights. 35 Historically, the first fundamental
rights of international law were recognized by Blackstone as the right
of safe passage, safety of ambassadors, and piracy.36 Courts now rec-
ognize, however, that the ATS must be viewed as referring to
contemporary universal human rights norms.37 Torts that fall short of
universal principals of human dignity are not cognizable under the
ATS. 38 The ATS depends specifically on customary international law,
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States," and also grants jurisdiction over acts
committed outside the U.S., but does not create a cause of action in itself-reference must
be made to an existing cause under international law.); see also Sosa v. Alvarex-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005) (law of nations is customary international laws).
31. - Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164-5 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing
Kadic, 70 F.3d at238).
32. Stutts v. De Dietrich Group, No. 03-CV-4058(ILG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47638
(E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2006).
33. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700 (2004).
34. Rasul, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
35. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238; Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 447 (2d Cir.
2000). Adamu v. Pfizer, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
36. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
37. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820) Contemporary universal human rights norms may be
located by "consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the
general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that
law.").
38. Frazer v. Chicago Bridge and Iron, No. H-05-3109, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23367 at
16 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2006) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss because negligence and
negligence per se are not recognized under the Alien Tort Statute).
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as opposed to treaties, most of which are not enforceable as private
rights of action in U.S. courts.
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, a decision that determined the status of Customary Interna-
tional Law within the courts of the United States. 39 Customary
International Law refers not to a complex body of law, but rather to the
most basic of human rights norms agreed upon between nations, essen-
tially instilling prohibitions against slavery, piracy, genocide, and
torture. This limited content is legitimated by no particular moral the-
ory, but solely by international consensus, an idea that compliments
our form of democracy. Indeed, these rights are guaranteed only
within the framework of human rights, in other words, as rights that
apply not against individuals, but only against "state actors" or sover-
eigns. 40 Thus, Customary International Law "does not reach private,
non-state conduct" even when that conduct includes torture, execution,
and rape.41 It is a body of law limited to human rights' basic goals, to
affirm rights of the citizens against their sovereign to be free from such
things as torture, genocide, and slavery.
Federal courts have the authority to cautiously determine when
it is appropriate to imply a cause of action for the violation of interna-
tional human rights law. 42 Courts constrain those implied causes of
actions narrowly to acts that are "clear and unambiguous" violations of
international law.43 Such violations have been identified as "a handful
of heinous actions .. .each of which violates definable, universal and
obligatory norms."44
The concept of "customary international law" has been explored
in several recent cases. These cases have established that genocide,
war crimes, and enslavement are cognizable violations under the
ATS. 45 Similarly, terrorist attacks are also cognizable offenses under
39. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
40. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985)
(Edwards, J., concurring).
41. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 205-7 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
42. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 at 694.
43. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
44. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (Acts include torture, murder, slavery, genocide,
inhumane or degrading treatment, and systemic racial discrimination, among others).
45. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 305
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (recognizing genocide, war crimes, torture, and enslavement as violations of
international law); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (torture is a violation of customary
international law), Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-242 (torture, genocide cognizable under ATS as
violations of international law).
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intentional law and will support jurisdiction under the ATS.46 In such
circumstances, the "courts may fashion domestic common law remedies
to give effect to violations of customary international law."47 For ex-
ample, applying the ATS, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a district court's
verdict of both compensatory and punitive damages against a group of
individuals for torture during a military dictatorship in Ethiopia.48
The ATS has also been applied in torture cases. Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala established that torture falls within those "clear and unam-
biguous" violations of international law. 49 In Filartiga, a group of
citizens from Paraguay sued a non-U.S. citizen in U.S. federal courts
citing the torture and extra-judicial killing of a relative because of his
political views. 50 The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction within the federal courts over an incident
that took place abroad involving non-U.S. citizens. 51 The Second Cir-
cuit reversed the dismissal, finding subject matter jurisdiction in the
federal courts under the ATS because torture constituted a violation of
customary international law.
5 2
The Second Circuit drew this conclusion "[i]n the light of the
universal condemnation of torture in international agreements, and
the renunciation of torture as an instrument of official policy by virtu-
ally all of the nations of the world." 53 Specifically, the Second Circuit
stated that, "there is at present no dissent from the view that the guar-
anties [of human rights and fundamental freedoms] include, at a bare
minimum, the right to be free from torture."54 Thus, "for purposes of
civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader
before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."55 Since
Filartiga was decided, other courts have consistently agreed that tor-
ture is among the most certain prohibitions of customary international
law and therefore cognizable as a claim under the ATS. 56
46. Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 99-100 (D.C. 2003)
(finding jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute for the attacks of September 11, 2001).
47. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830
(1996).
48. Id.
49. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
50. Id. at 878-880.
51. Id. at 878.
52. Id. at 884.
53. Id. at 880.
54. Id. at 882.
55. Id. at 890.
56. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002) (including rape as a
form of torture); Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) ("the right
to be free from torture is fundamental and universal"); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
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Since a torture claim is derived from customary international
law, so are the limitations. The primary limit of customary interna-
tional law in torture cases is that the law applies only to state actors.
Customary international law "does not reach private, non-state con-
duct" even when that conduct includes torture, execution, and rape. 57
Thus, the D.C. Circuit, in Tel-Oren held that customary international
law would provide a remedy under ATS jurisdiction only where torture
was carried out either by or at the direction of a state. 58 The Second
Circuit agreed in Kadic v. Karadzic, finding that the alleged crimes
would be cognizable as violations of international law only if those
crimes were committed under state or official action. 59 While acknowl-
edging that some crimes may be cognizable as individual violations of
international law, including slave trading, piracy, and aircraft hi-
jacking, the court concluded that torture was prohibited in
international law only when committed by a state or at the direction of
the state. 6
0
State action, otherwise described as acting "under color of law"
is determined by reference "to principles of agency law and to jurispru-
dence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."61 Thus, the corporation may be liable
when it "acts together with state officials or with significant state
aid."62 State action has been found where the defendant and the state
participated in the alleged tortuous action jointly.63 State action may
also be shown where the defendant and state had "substantial
cooperation."
64
The evidence of state action requirement is particularly inter-
esting to consider in the context of the military contract. While
evidence of state orders is normally a part of the military contractor's
affirmative defense, such evidence is also a part of the plaintiffs claim
to jurisdiction under the ATS where the torts include torture. 65 Thus,
in the process of seeking the defense, the contractor will also substanti-
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1992) ("There is no doubt that the prohibition against
official torture is a norm of customary international law.").
57. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d at 206-7.
58. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791.
59. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
60. Id. at 243.
61. Id. at 245.
62. Id.(citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)).
63. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 890 F.2d 184,
189 (9th Cir. 1989).
64. Ge v. Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 21-22 (D.D.C. 2000).
65. See, Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 (finding that state action is required for jurisdiction
under the ATS).
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ate the plaintiffs claim to jurisdiction under the ATS. While this is an
interesting practical problem for litigants, the "state action" require-
ment relates specifically to the issue of the superior orders defense. It
is important to note that as the basis of both the plaintiff and defense
claims, each party will be arguing that a governmental or military
body directed the conduct at issue.
B. Federal Tort Claims Act
As a sovereign, the United States government maintains the
right to determine when it will or will not consent to be sued.66 When
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was enacted, the United States
exercised that right, granting a limited waiver of sovereign immu-
nity.67 The FTCA provides the only remedy for torts committed by the
government or government employees who are acting within the scope
of their employment. 68 The FTCA does not specifically address the lia-
bility of contractors who act at the direction of the federal government.
However, the FTCA is relevant to the analysis of government contrac-
tor liability because the FTCA is often cited as the source of multiple
justifications for the government contractor defense.
69
The justifications for the government contractor defense arise
from two limitations to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity.
These two limitations are as follows: claims resulting from exercise of
the "discretionary function"70 and claims "arising out of the combatant
activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during
time of war."71 The discretionary function exception to the waiver of
liability was first examined in this context in Boyle v. United Techs.
Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). In Boyle, a wrongful death suit for dam-
ages allegedly caused by a defective helicopter design, the Supreme
Court found that at issue in the case was a governmental policy deci-
sion about the trade-offs between military effectiveness and passenger
safety.72 The court found that the FTCA's discretionary function ex-
66. U.S. v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 537-538 (1980).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2005).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2005).
69. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988) (the court's analysis is
summarized in Ibrahim v. Titan, 391 F. Supp. 2d. at 17-19, as having "concluded that the
application of state law liability theory presented a 'significant conflict' with federal policies
or interests, finding guidance in the 'discretionary function' exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA).").
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2005).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2005).
72. Boyle, at 511-513.
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ception provided the government room to preserve for such policy-
making decisions with immunity from suit resulting from such policy
decisions. 73 Boyle concluded that when a contractor acted pursuant to
such an act of discretionary authority of the government, the contrac-
tor too should be shielded from tort liability, so long as there was strict
compliance with the government's instructions. 74 On the other hand,
the "combatant activities" exception refers explicitly to any activities
that take place in the "time of war."75 In Koohi v. United States, the
court found that the "combatant activities" exception was designed to
summarize a basic tort principle: that no duty of care is owed to some-
one targeted in a military action even if accidentally targeted. 76
Following upon the Supreme Court's analysis of these two FTCA ex-
ceptions to give guidance in expanding the military contractor defense,
lower courts have continued to examine these two exceptions as a part
of the theoretical justifications for both limitations and extensions of
the government contractor defense.77
C. Torture Victims Protection Act
In 1991, the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) amended the
Alien Tort Statute by adding a definition of torture and specifically af-
firming a grant of jurisdiction for cases of torture.78 The TVPA defines
torture as "any act, directed against an individual in the offender's cus-
tody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering... whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual."79
While the TVPA did not specifically include a discussion of sexual of-
fenses, some courts have held that alleged sexual abuse comes within
the umbrella of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment while others
have concluded that such acts are more difficult to define than "tor-
ture, execution, disappearance, or arbitrary detention."80
Beyond the definition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treat-
ment, the wording used in the TVPA has created two issues of
73. Id.
74. Id. at 512.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2005).
76. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992) (this case involved a
civilian aircraft).
77. See, Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
78. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005)).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1350, section 3(b) of Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.
80. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181 (2005) (quoting
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 2d 162, 186 (D. Mass. 1995)).
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interpretation. First, when torture by contractors is alleged, it is im-
portant to note that the TVPA uses the term "individual."8' Some
courts have concluded that the plain meaning of this term is a limita-
tion to real persons, rather than corporations,8 2 while other courts
have concluded that corporations are individuals under the statute.8 3
Since usage of the terms "individual" and "person" in other legal con-
texts have at times included corporations,8 4 the issue remains
unresolved.
Second, the TVPA establishes liability of "any individual who,
under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign na-
tion. . ." commits acts of torture.8 5 This definition of torture contains
the phrase "foreign nation," which by its plain meaning in a U.S. stat-
ute might be interpreted to suggest that the definition of torture is
limited to individuals acting under the actual or apparent authority of
a government other than the United States. Arguing the plain mean-
ing of the statute, contractors of the U.S. government could claim that
the TVPA does not apply to them. While issues of terminology could
arguably limit the applicability of the TVPA to contractors working
under the U.S. government, this may not be fatal to plaintiffs' suits.
The TVPA is not necessary to establish a cause of action for torture
since the ATS can provide a remedy directly by reference to customary
international law. For example, in Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., the court denied claims against the corporation under the
TVPA, holding that the domestic oil company accused of human rights
abuses in Colombia was not an "individual" as required by the TVPA.
However, the Court accepted that a claim for torture could still con-
tinue under customary international law through the jurisdiction of
the ATS.86
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Section 2 of Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 provides that
civil liability is available for an "individual" who is acting "under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.
82. Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (dismissing TVPA claims against defendants on
the grounds that defendant was a corporation rather than an individual and stating that
"individual" does not including corporations (citing In re Agent Orange Product Liability
Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005))).
83. Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1266-67 (N.D.
Ala. 2003) (Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1358-59 (S.D. Fla. 2003))
(finding no intent to exclude corporations from liability in the TVPA's legislative history,
noting that corporations are "persons" as described within other areas of law).
84. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 (1998) (noting that individual is
synonymous with person and person "includes corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies as well as individuals.").
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(a) (1991).
86. Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1183.
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The TVPA establishes liability for acts of torture8 7 but does not
involve itself in the more nuanced questions regarding the possibility
of liability for aiding and abetting or for conspiracy to commit torture.
Given the factual context of the torture allegations arising from Af-
ghanistan and Iraq where contractors and military personnel may
have acted in conjunction, the issue of liability for aiding and abetting
may become significant. s8 Defendants have already taken advantage
of the lack of specificity in the TVPA, arguing that the TVPA does not
recognize or allow for aiding and abetting liability. For example, in
Mujica, the defendant oil company argued that the TVPA did not rec-
ognize a cause of action for aiding and abetting torture. Nevertheless,
the court addressed this issue, concluding "that the TVPA does provide
for aiding and abetting liability."8 9 In reaching this decision, Mujica
relied on several other recent cases that found the TVPA supported
liability for aiding and abetting.90
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991). The TVPA provides a civil remedy for acts of torture,
where torture is defined as "any act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody
or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising
only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual
or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that
individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed,
intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind; and
"(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting
from-
"(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or
suffering;
"(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or
application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to
disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
"(C) the threat of imminent death; or
"(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be subjected to death,
severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of
mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or personality."
88. See Private Security Contractors at War, supra note 14, at 52-53 (citing the
involvement of contractors from Titan and CACI International in torture incidents at Abu
Ghraib, particularly in giving orders to military personnel for torture incidents and in being
present in photographs depicting torture, and therefore allowing even if not participating in
the torture practices).
89. Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
90. Barrueto v. Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (stating that
TVPA's legislative history is applicable to aiders and abettors of unlawful acts); Doe v.
Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (plaintiff sought aiding and abetting
liability against an officer who arranged and paid for an assassination to be carried out by
another individual; the court held that the TVPA's legislative history supports liability for
accomplices); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1355-56 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (noting
that a U.S. Senate Report indicates that the TVPA was intended to reach accomplice
liability).
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Whether the party is the principal or simply aiding and abet-
ting, the TVPA applies to those acts taken "under color of law."
Actions taken "under color of law" are generally understood to be acts
taken "together with state officials or with significant state aid."91
Again, in the case of military contractors' actions, this definition points
to a governmental directive to carry out the alleged tortuous activity.
This issue will become significant when the superior orders defense is
examined more closely.
III. THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENSE
A person who claims the defense of superior orders asks that his
conduct be excused on the grounds that he did not himself choose the
relevant action but rather was directed to do so by a governing political
or military authority.92 The defense is not novel, as it dates back to the
first known instance of a "war crimes tribunal" in 1474. 9 3 In early Aus-
trian forums, the defense was rejected by the tribunal on the grounds
that orders from the Duke could not be accepted when they violate "the
law of God."
94
In the last century, the superior orders defense received spec-
tacular international press when Adolph Eichmann claimed it during
his trial in 1961. 95 Eichmann first articulated his superior orders de-
fense when he minimized his own choices to act and explained that he
was merely "a little cog in the machinery."96 By the descriptions of
historians, Eichmann was the person with primary responsibility for
the "final solution" to the "Jewish problem" and thus was responsible
for directing operations in forced removal and concentration camps.
9 7
At his trial, Eichmann repeatedly emphasized his role as merely a sol-
dier who accepted his orders without questioning them.98 The defense,
91. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
92. International Criminal Law 123-128 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
93. Solis, supra note 26, at 485.
94. See generally Matthew R. Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Development and
Scope of the Superior Orders Defense, 20 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 153 (2001) ("the law of God"
was a term used to mean a most foundational violation of the dignity of human beings as
creatures of God).
95. Id. at 184.
96. A. EICHMANN, Eichmann Tells His Own Damning Story, LIFE MAGAZINE, Nov. 28,
1960, at 19, available at http://www.einsatzgruppenarchives.com/trials/profiles/
confession.html (last visited February 9, 2009)
97. Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The Trial of Adolph Eichmann and the Quest for
Global Justice, 8 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 45, 50 (2002).
98. Jochen Von Lang ET. AL., Eichmann Interrogated: Transcripts from the Archives of
Israeli Police 158 (1983).
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which became known as "superior orders," was explicitly rejected in
Eichmann's trial.9 9 The Nuremberg Tribunal determined that supe-
rior orders could not be used as a defense to war crimes although in
some instances the judge could consider superior orders in mitigating
punishment.' 00
Since that time, both international law and U.S. law have af-
firmed that clear violations of jus cogens, such as torture, cannot be
justified by a defense of superior orders.1 1 War crimes tribunals from
Nuremberg to Yugoslavia have affirmed that superior orders do not
relieve the defendant from responsibility for his actions in violation of
the laws of war. 10 2 Additionally, under U.S. law, the defense will not
protect a U.S. soldier who acted on orders of his superior officers if the
illegal act at issue was a clear violation of international law. 10 3
Banning superior orders as a defense to war crimes is a move-
ment based on a specific understanding of the nature of international
law and individual responsibilities under that law. This was illus-
trated when the Nuremburg Tribunal rejected Eichmann's defense of
superior orders. The Nuremburg decision understood international
law to apply not only to nations but also to individual persons.' 0 4 Ap-
plying international law to persons not only meant that individuals
could be responsible for violations but also that those individuals were
charged with certain duties, including the duty to examine whether an
order violates customary international law before following that order.
This understanding was deemed necessary to prevent human rights
violations. "Crimes against international law were committed by men,
not by 'abstract entities,' and only by punishing individual perpetra-
tors can the provisions of international law be preserved and
enforced."'1 5 Thus, the ban on the superior orders defense is ultimately
a recognition that international law exists as an external, higher au-
thority to which all individuals must submit, over and above any
99. See Lippman, supra note 93, at 184.
100. See Lippman, supra note 93, at 184.
101. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 6.1.4 (1997).
102. Solis, supra note 25, at 510.
103. Solis, supra note 25, at 510. However, liability may be mediated by consideration
of superior orders as essentially an extenuating circumstance. Additionally, the rule is
limited to "clear violations," such as torture, rape, and slavery. Individual soldiers are not
asked to make tough calls about borderline practices or to know the detail of complex
international laws.
104. See Lippman, supra note 92, at 182.
105. See Lippman, supra note 92, at 182.
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obligations to follow the orders of a particular government or military
body.'0
6
The superior orders defense bears a striking resemblance to the
government contractor defense. Indeed, there is analytically no mean-
ingful difference between the two in the context of human rights
violations by a contractor. The superior orders defense suggests that a
person should be immune from prosecution, provided that he followed
instructions as given to him by a superior officer acting under a gov-
ernment. The government contractor defense suggests that a person or
corporation should be immune from a tort suit, provided that govern-
ment orders were given and followed. In both cases, there is a transfer
of governmental immunity to the agent who is acting on behalf of the
government. Given the strong resemblance between the two defenses,
the government contractor defense should be considered a companion
to the superior orders defense, and therefore, should not be allowable
in the case of clear violations of international law.
There is some debate about the propriety of banning the supe-
rior orders defense in all circumstances, particularly those instances
where the guilt of an individual soldier is not clear. 10 7 Those doubts
apply to circumstances where defendants face criminal charges, possi-
bly even the death penalty.108 While there may be reasons to consider
the defense as a mitigating factor with criminal charges, particularly
offenses punishable by death are involved , the reasoning is not neces-
sarily transferable to torts where the worst punishment that a party
could receive is monetary damages or an injunction. It is also impor-
tant to note that defendants will be sophisticated corporations that are
able to retain legal counsel to advise on the laws of war.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR
DEFENSE IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Although one of the rationales for the government contractor
defense is found in the FTCA's affirmation of governmental discretion
and immunity, the defense was judicially created. 10 9 Therefore, no
statute has set forth the nature and scope of the defense although the
106. See Solis, supra note 25, at 510.
107. See, e.g., Solis, supra note 26.
108. See generally, Solis, supra note 26, regarding the advisability of banning the
defense completely.
109. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
Vol. 4:1:43
2009 THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE 61
defense was codified as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.110
The government contractor defense exists as a part of federal common
law and serves to protect a contractor from liability under state tort
statutes when the contractor acted specifically pursuant to government
instructions.1 ' Initially, the government contractor defense existed in
various forms with different circuits recognizing a series of related yet
distinct defenses for military contractors.
1 1 2
In Boyle v. United Technologies, decided in 1988, the Supreme
Court affirmed the existence of the government contractor defense and
specified its scope." 3 The defense was developed in the context of
products liability suits and the emphasis was on the immunity of the
federal government when it acted to procure goods for military use.
114
In Boyle, plaintiffs brought a products liability suit alleging wrongful
death against a military contractor that had manufactured a helicop-
ter. The helicopter was manufactured under a contract with the U.S.
government that used very specific design specifications approved by
the government. The specifications required the helicopter doors to
open outward, a feature that plaintiffs particularly cited as dangerous
to passengers. The plaintiffs' decedents were killed when the helicop-
ter crashed into the ocean. Documents produced in discovery indicated
that the government was aware of the risk of having the doors open
only outward, notably, that the doors could not be opened under water
due to the pressure of the liquid against the exterior. However, the
documents indicated that the government was aware of this flaw but
considered it a trade-off. The government determined that there were
strategic military benefits if the doors opened outward, including un-
loading the helicopter faster. Boyle's facts were particularly
110. 6 U.S.C.A. §442(d) (West 2002) (d) Government Contractor Defense (1) In general
Should a product liability or other lawsuit be filed for claims arising out of, relating to, or
resulting from an act of terrorism when qualified anti-terrorism technologies approved by
the Secretary, as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection, have been deployed
in defense against or response or recovery from such act and such claims result or may
result in loss to the Seller, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the government
contractor defense applies in such lawsuit. This presumption shall only be overcome by
evidence showing that the Seller acted fraudulently or with willful misconduct in
submitting information to the Secretary during the course of the Secretary's consideration
of such technology under this subsection. This presumption of the government contractor
defense shall apply regardless of whether the claim against the Seller arises from a sale of
the product to Federal Government or non-Federal Government customers.
111. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
112. See, e.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985); Johnston v. United
States, 568 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1983); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985).
113. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-13.
114. Id. at 511.
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sympathetic to the contractor. United Technologies followed the gov-
ernment's specifications to the letter but was sued for having done so.
The Supreme Court focused on sovereign immunity as the justi-
fication and this specifically influenced the test created in Boyle for
applying the defense. 115 The government contractor defense has as
three specific prongs: (1) specifications, (2) conformance to those speci-
fications, and (3) disclosure to the federal government. 116 The test was
designed to apply only where liability for the contractor would threaten
the government's "discretionary function."117 In essence, the first two
prongs require that the contractor's act results from an order of the
government and that the order was followed.
While the defense initially developed in products liability cases,
it has expanded in scope to include services contracts in limited cir-
cumstances. In addition, there have even been extensions of the
defense to non-military contractors of the government."18 For example,
the government contractor defense has also been asserted in cases con-
cerning drugs distributed by U.S. companies abroad, where
experimental drugs were used outside of FDA regulations and resulted
in death. 119 Additionally, the defense was codified and expanded by
the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of
2002 (SAFETY Act), which brought the defense back to its original
roots in products, focusing on the development of new technologies that
would support anti-terrorism efforts of the United States after the ter-
rorist attacks of 9/11.120
Other changes may be happening more slowly through judicial
application of the defense. While the defense has traditionally been
justified under the "discretionary function" exception to the FTCA
waiver of immunity, contractors are seeking to use the FTCA's "com-
batant activities exception." Contractors have argued that the
decisions in Koohi v. United States and Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft,
demonstrate extensions of the "combatant activities exception" immu-
nity beyond the government to military contractors. 121 Moving beyond
115. Id. at 511-13.
116. Id. at 512.
117. Id.
118. See Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant, a non-military contractor and producer of a veterinary
vaccine).
119. See Adamu, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (plaintiffs argued that experimental use of
drugs by a U.S. corporation violated human rights laws).
120. 6 U.S.C. § 441-444 (2005).
121. See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992), Bentzlin v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
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the Supreme Court's pre-emption of state law analysis in Boyle, the
Koohi case wove a stronger strand through the defense: an absolute
proclamation, based on the combatant activities exception of the
FTCA, as establishing that there is "no duty of reasonable care" in time
of war. 122 The distinction is significant because if there was indeed "no
duty of reasonable care" in time of war, that assertion would be a part
of federal common law stemming from the FTCA "combatant activities"
provision rather than state law. As a part of federal common law, the
"no-duty rule" would function to shield government contractors from
liability in both federal and state court, whereas the traditional gov-
ernment contractor defense was limited to shielding the contractor
from state tort liability. 123
Koohi and Bentzlin, products liability cases that involved the
use of weaponry during combat, have not been followed by other
courts. 124 One case has already specifically endorsed this limitation.
In Smith v. Halliburton, the court found that the "combatant activi-
ties" rationale would extend only to defective products suits. 125
In summary, the government contractor defense has evolved
significantly over the past thirty years, moving from products liability
to services, and even reaching non-military contractors of the federal
government. Contractors have successfully pushed the boundaries of
the defense.
V. APPLYING THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE TO
HuMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
This section compares the government contractor defense to the
superior orders defense. The discussion begins with the various ratio-
nales for the government contractor defense: federalism and
preemption, separation of powers and the political question doctrine,
and sovereign immunity. As important and established as these ratio-
nales are, in instances where basic human rights are allegedly violated
by a contractor, the establishment of the government contractor de-
fense is eerily similar to the superior orders defense.
122. Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1336-7.
123. Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1335-36.
124. Distinguishing Koohi and Benzlin: Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610 (S.D.
Tex. 2005); Lessin v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., No. CIVA H-05-01853, 2006 WL
3940556 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006); Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., 450
F. Supp. 2d 1373 (N.D.Ga. 2006); Smith v. Halliburton Co., Civil Action No. H-06-0462,
2006 WL 1342823, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2006).
125. Smith, 2006 WL 1342823 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2006).
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A. Rationales for the Government Contractor Defense
Three primary rationales have been articulated in support of
the government contractor defense. Each of these rationales is linked
to the idea of a superior governmental order to carry out a forbidden
act. In the sections below each, of the three primary rationales is ex-
amined in detail.
1. Federalism and Preemption
Under Boyle, the government contractor defense was framed as
a question of preemption: the degree to which national defense con-
cerns of the federal government prevented the normal operation of
state tort laws. 126 The problem has been conceptualized in terms of
the Supremacy Clause which forbids state regulation of the federal
government, and the "foreign affairs doctrine" which maintains that
foreign relations and national defense are the exclusive province of the
political branches. 1
27
The Supremacy Clause prevents the states from regulating ac-
tivities of the federal government. 128  While cases citing the
Supremacy Clause have generally involved regulatory issues, such as
taxation and environmental monitoring, government contractors have
also raised the issue. The Supreme Court has specifically determined
that the Supremacy Clause's limit on state regulation of federal activi-
ties continues to apply when the activities are carried out by a private
government contractor rather than by the federal government. 129 The
foreign affairs doctrine prevents states from entering "into the field of
foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and
the Congress."'130 All "power over foreign affairs is reserved to the fed-
eral government." 13 1 In practice, the foreign affairs doctrine means
that state laws are displaced where normal operation of those laws
would "disturb foreign relations.' 13 2
Both the foreign affairs doctrine and the Supremacy Clause are
linked to the idea that the federal government has the right and capac-
ity to give orders that cannot be impeded or later questioned by state
126. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507-08.
127. Id.
128. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
129. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988).
130. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
131. Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2003).
132. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441.
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level political bodies. 133 While these doctrines have applied in preemp-
tion and politics, violations of international human rights laws are a
unique situation. In rejecting the superior orders defense, interna-
tional human rights law have determined that every individual has the
responsibility of understanding conduct that is absolutely prohibited
under international law.' 34 The individual has the responsibility of ad-
hering to the prohibitions even when directly ordered by a superior
officer to do otherwise. Thus, while many federal governmental deci-
sions are not reviewable by courts, the rejection of the superior orders
defense in international law means that each individual is responsible
for reviewing every order, of every government, that may violate inter-
national human rights law. It is then, an absurd result to say that the
state level courts cannot do what international human rights law
charges each individual with the responsibility of doing.
2. Separation of Powers and the Political Question Doctrine
Another primary justification of the government contractor de-
fense is the doctrine of a non-justiciable political question. Political
question cases are "committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or
the confines of the Executive Branch," because those cases "revolve
around policy choices and value determinations" that have been consti-
tutionally delegated to those branches. 35 The political question
doctrine affirms that issues of national policy must be given to the peo-
ple through their political representatives. 36 At its essence, the
political question doctrine "is primarily a function of the separation of
powers."
13 7
When the political question doctrine applies, it removes juris-
diction from the court. 38 While the political question doctrine is a
commonly cited justification for the government contractor defense, it
is also an unique and separate defense.' 39 The political question doc-
133. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507-508.
134. See Solis, supra note 25, at 510 (by implication every corporation has a duty to
understand international law).
135. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
136. Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn v. Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th
Cir. 1978).
137. Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
138. Occidental, 577 F.2d at 1203.
139. See, e.g., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, (M.D. Fla.
2006) (arguing political question doctrine as defense to tort claim against contractor for
death of U.S. servicemen killed in flight); Ibrahim v. Titan, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (noting the
court's rejection of defendant's claim of political question doctrine as immunity from tort
suit for torture).
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trine raises issues of whether or not the plaintiffs allegations are, in
fact, justiciable. 140 Thus, while the government contractor defense
only results in state law preemption, the political question doctrine re-
sults in the court refusing to hear the action.1 4 1 When the political
question doctrine is raised, the defendant may argue that the court
"may not take cognizance of the plaintiffs action."'142 The defendant
further noted that when the motion is sustained, the political question
doctrine can render an entire case or controversy beyond the reach of
the courts.
143
Although the doctrine can result in completely barring a claim,
the defense will not necessarily apply in allegations of torture by mili-
tary contractors or other military-related actions. For example, in
Koohi, a case where a U.S. warship shot down a civilian aircraft, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff's claims should not be dismissed
under the political question doctrine. 144 More recently, in Ibrahim v.
Titan Corporation, a case that alleged torture by government contrac-
tors at Abu Ghraib, the court rejected the defendants' argument that
the claims were barred by the political question doctrine. 145 Similarly,
in McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., the court ruled that the po-
litical question doctrine did not bar claims arising from an aircraft
crash in Afghanistan, because the claim implicated primarily issues of
tort law rather than military tactics. 46 In general, courts appear to be
applying the political question doctrine less frequently and more
cautiously.1
47
The test for a political question involves a review of six possible
situations:
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the case
to a coordinate political department; or (2) a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or (3) the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
140. Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (noting political question doctrine requires
nonjusticiability of matters due to separation of powers).
141. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (discussing the political question doctrine as placing
items "beyond judicial cognizance").
142. Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1331 (noting defendant's assertion that political question
doctrine render case beyond court's reach).
143. Id.
144. Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1331 (noting that a "key element" in the analysis is the seeking
of damages rather than injunctive relief).
145. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
146. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. at 1331.
147. See McMahon, 460 F. Supp. at 1319 (stating that "[ilndeed, it is with increasing
rarity that a case is dismissed on political question grounds" (citing In re Agent Orange
Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 65-69 (E.D.N.Y. 2005))).
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kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or (4) the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or (5) an un-
usual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multi-
farious pronouncements by various departments on one
question. 148
These six possible situations are not, however, of equal importance.
The six possibilities "are probably listed in descending order of both
importance and certainty."149
Arguments by defendant-contractors are likely to focus on the
first two situations. 150 Questions related to "provisions for national se-
curity and defense" are "perhaps the most clearly marked for judicial
deference." 15 ' In fact, "[t]he Constitution mandates that war and for-
eign policy are the provenance of the Executive." 15 2 The political
question doctrine stems not only from our basic separation of powers
but also from a concern that "many such questions uniquely demand
[a] single-voiced statement of the Government's views." 153 Thus, any
case involving accusations of violations of human rights on foreign soil
is likely to raise the possibility of a non-justiciable political question.
In recent decades, several decisions have underscored the reluc-
tance of courts to become involved in matters of military strategy and
national defense. In Gilligan v. Morgan, a case involving the training
of National Guard troops, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "it is difficult
to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts
have less competence." 54 When applying the military contractor de-
fense, the Fifth Circuit has found that "interference by civilian courts
with military authority inevitably raises both questions about judicial
competency in this area and separation of powers concerns."' 55 Addi-
tionally, the Second Circuit has stated even more absolutely that "[t]he
strategy and tactics employed on the battlefield are clearly not subject
to judicial review."' 56 Thus, precedent suggests that courts will be ex-
tremely cautious in involving themselves in decisions of the military
148. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
149. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004).
150. Both were argued in Smith v. Halliburton, and both were rejected at the time the
Motion to Dismiss was denied on May 16, 2006.
151. Tiffany v. United States, 931 F.2d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 1991).
152. Fisher v. Halliburton, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (S.D Tex. 2006).
153. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
154. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).
155. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 562.
156. Tiffany, 931 F.2d at 277.
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during times of war. One of the primary concerns voiced by the courts
is that "[i]n order to hear [the] case, the court would have to substitute
its judgment for that of the Army." 157 This justification, however,
strongly conflicts with the international law consensus on the barred
superior orders defense which requires that all persons consistently
question governmental orders when those orders call for a violation of
the limited number of absolute principles of human rights law.
158
Additionally, clear violations of international human rights
laws implicate another constitutional principal: checks and balances.
Historically, courts have tackled political questions of human rights
issues where the other branches would allow oppression, violence, and
injustice to continue.' 5 9 Courts, thus, may aspire to use their power to
force the government to adhere to fundamental human rights and dig-
nity. While constitutional rights have been historically limited to
United States citizens, the courts have also recognized that at the time
the Constitution was created there existed an international customary
law of human rights that the framers intended to be accessible through
federal common law.' 60 "With the founding of the 'more perfect union'
of 1789, the law of nations became preeminently a federal concern,"
and thus a part of the federal common law as opposed to the common
law of the states. 1
61
If the political question doctrine forbids the courts entry into
these areas of law, then the executive and legislative branches are es-
sentially able to confer the authority to commit war crimes at least
until the people have a chance to remove them from office at the next
election. Such an interpretation is not consistent with the history of
U.S. courts as sources of justice and redress when none is available
elsewhere. 162 As the Supreme Court has previously stated, "[i]t would
indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction
the subversion of one of those liberties... which makes the defense of
the Nation worthwhile." 63 Moreover, it is the basic intent of interna-
tional law to supersede even executive powers of the nations, thus
"confer[ing] fundamental rights upon all people vis-A-vis their own gov-
157. Fisher, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 643.
158. See Solis, supra note 25, at 510.
159. See, Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp.2d at 16 (noting that there is no issue of separation of
powers where the acts of the contractor 'violate clear United States policy" against human
rights crimes).
160. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
161. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
162. Boumediene v. Bush 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008) (affirming U.S. courts as a source
of justice and redress when none are available elsewhere).
163. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
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ernments." 164 Therefore, questioning the orders of governmental
bodies when those orders violate international human rights law is not
only acceptable but is necessary to further the safety and dignity of
people everywhere.
In response, contractors are likely to argue a practical problem
of judicial interference with military strategy: the need for the military
to accept risks beyond those normally tolerated by citizens. 165 Na-
tional security requires that our military "push technology towards its
limits and thereby incur risks beyond those that would be acceptable
for ordinary consumer goods." 166 The higher tolerance for risk is an
acceptable argument when made specifically in products liability suits.
However, it does not logically carry over to torture. The higher toler-
ance for risk is not appropriate in international human rights law
which has developed a consensus on the absolute prohibition of
torture. 167
3. Sovereign Immunity and Costs
The third primary justification for the government contractor
defense is the problem of costs of litigation being passed on in a way
that violates sovereign immunity. The federal government is generally
immune from suit, whether the suit is brought in state or in federal
court.' 68 While the FTCA functions as consent of the government to be
sued, this consent applies in only very limited circumstances. 169 More-
over, the FTCA specifically affirmed sovereign immunity for "any claim
arising out of combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the
Coast Guard, during time of war."170
In terms of sovereign immunity, the government contractor de-
fense was initially justified because contractors' costs in litigation
logically would be passed on to the government, thus effectively al-
lowing plaintiffs to avoid governmental immunity from suit. 17 ' Since
extra costs would be "passed-through" to the government, allowing tort
suits to proceed against contractors would be equivalent to allowing
164. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
165. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449-50 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
166. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting McKay v. Rockwell
International Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449-50 (9th Cir. 1983)).
167. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
168. See, e.g., Mitchell, 445 U.S. at 535.
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).
171. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510.
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
suits against the government. 172 The costs to the government must be
made judicially irrelevant in the context of fundamental human rights
and the violation of customary international laws. The courts cannot
allow the development of a market for services that include torture and
other human rights violations at the State's behest.
Finally, the "pass-through" rationale is of minor concern in the
traditional justifications of the defense. In writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia accepted the rationale in Boyle, but Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun disagreed, suggesting that the pass-through
of costs was only a "marginal" concern. 173 Since the pass-through ra-
tionale is controversial even in a simple products liability action, it is a
less likely justification in the difficult context of human rights viola-
tions. Courts should be wary about putting monetary values on the
violation of human rights.
B. The Prima Facie Case and the Superior Orders Defense
As elaborated by the U.S. Supreme Court, the government con-
tractor defense requires proof of three elements. These three elements
are as follows: specifications, conformance to those specifications, and
disclosure of known risks to the federal government.174 The first prong
of the test is widely considered to be the most significant hurdle. The
first prong requires that the activity or product at issue be specifically
requested by the federal government. Invitations, musings, and gen-
eral suggestions do not qualify as specific requests. 175 Furthermore,
courts strictly require "reasonably precise specifications." 176 If the con-
tractor is able to prove the first prong, then to meet the second prong, it
must then prove that it adhered to the specifications that were pro-
vided. 177 The defendant must prove that it was able to "strictly adhere
to previously established, government-approved specifications." 7 8
These two prongs are notably similar to the prima facie case one
would present under the superior orders defense, were it allowed in
international law. For the government contractor defense, one would
argue that the government provided the instructions/specifications,
and secondly, that the contractor followed those to the letter. The su-
172. Id. at 511-512.
173. Id. at 523-4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 512.
175. Id.
176. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
177. Id.
178. See Colin P. Cahoon, Boyle Under Siege, 59 J. AIR L. & CoM. 815, 836 (1994)
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perior orders defense requires that an individual received orders from
a senior officer or governmental official and complied with those or-
ders. Thus, for the superior orders defense, one would argue
instructions from an agent of the government, and strict compliance
with those instructions. Therefore, proof of both defenses follows the
same analytical chain.
VI. SUPERIOR ORDERS AND ENSURING HuMAN RIGHTS
There is a lasting moral and political significance to prohibiting
the superior orders defense in human rights litigation. Scholars who
have studied the problem of human rights violations after the Holo-
caust have concluded that the best possible method of preventing such
gross violations in the future is encouraging "human autonomy." 179
Thus, the future of human rights and human dignity can be affirmed
by encouraging every individual's critical engagement with the issues
and by strenuously upholding the individual's right to refuse orders in
violations of basic human dignity. This most significant endeavor is
not possible if the superior orders defense is tolerated in civil human
rights litigation. Courts must conclude that the government contractor
defense does not apply to human rights violations.' 80
VII. CONCLUSION
At one time, American law played a significant role in the devel-
opment of international human rights law, but in recent years, the
United States "has had no more than a walk-on part in their clarifica-
tion and application by international institutions."1 8 This change has
largely resulted from the refusal of the political branches to ratify, and
even theoretically engage, the more recent treaties establishing human
rights. The United States' reduced role in international human rights,
along with the scandal of Abu Ghraib, and the criticism of Guanta-
namo Bay, have created an unfortunate international reputation.
These acts have "undermined the moral and political credibility" of the
United States. 8 2 In light of this negative evaluation, critical attention
will be paid to how the United States deals with claims against its own
179. Giroux, supra note 9, at 796.
180. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 91
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
181. Lillich, Richard B., The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM.
JOURNAL OF INT'L L. 851, 853 (1989).
182. Giroux, supra note 9, at 782.
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citizens and corporations for violations of international human rights.
Fortunately, civil litigation may give reason for hope.
Through civil litigation, the judicial branch should affirm its
willingness to check the political branches, particularly the executive
branch, and force compliance with international human rights princi-
ples. The possible repercussions are significant. Courts may be able to
curtail a "rogue" executive administration that may endorse torture.
Courts may be able to restore the U.S. image internationally on human
rights issues. Even where the U.S. refuses to ratify an international
treaty, if the norm contained in the treaty becomes a part of customary
international law, then that norm "ipso facto becomes supreme federal
law and hence may regulate activities, relations or interests within the
United States" through the judicial branch.18 3 While this possibility is
exciting, the ability of the courts to use customary international law is
very much dependent on how the courts interpret the Alien Tort Stat-
ute and the potential defenses.
Therefore, while the political branches may continue to disen-
gage or refuse to refrain from curtailing outrageous conduct under the
guise of National Security, the judicial branch is becoming increasingly
involved in international human rights through the litigation of indi-
vidual civil claims, including claims against American contractors.
Judicial willingness to hear those claims and to limit the applicability
of defenses-such as the government contractor defense and the politi-
cal question doctrine-will set the stage for the future of the American
role in international human rights.
183. Lillich, supra note 179, at 856.
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